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LINCOLN, Abraham. Autograph letter signed ("A. Lincoln") TO MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE BRINTON MCCLELLAN (1826-1885), Washington, D.C., 21 May 1862. 1 page, 4to (210 x 195 mm.), "Washington City, D.C." stationery, blank top and bottom of the sheet slightly trimmed, tiny repairs to left hand edge, vertical fold at right carefully reinforced from verso, tipped to a larger sheet within ink-ruled borders, otherwise in good condition.
LINCOLN TO MCCLELLAN ON TACTICS FOR THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN
An important letter at a crucial point in the Union army's ultimately unsuccessful land offensive against the Confederate capital. It is one of the most significant letters in what constitutes a particularly important exchange between the Commander-in-Chief and General McClellan, a correspondence extensively studied and analyzed by Lincoln's biographers and historians of the war.
Lincoln writes: "Your long despatch of yesterday just received. You will have just such control of Gen. McDowell and his force as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg,--unless his march shall be resisted [by the Confederate army], in which case, the force resisting him, will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single Division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it."
"I would hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success," Lincoln once quipped. McClellan's plan to take Richmond by landing the main Union army on the peninsula, 75 miles below Richmond, had been reluctantly approved by the President, who feared it would leave the city of Washington unprotected. Having assured Lincoln that troops adequate to defend the capital had been left behind, McClellan's armies were transported by ship to Fortress Monroe in March and in April, after repeated urgings from Lincoln, began to move, ponderously and cautiously, up the peninsula, taking Yorktown after a wasteful seige, on May 3. McClellan, a Democrat, became increasingly convinced that the Confederate armies heavily outnumbered his men, and developed a paranoic conviction that the Republican administration was witholding support and even--perhaps for political reasons--wished him to fail. In this period, "his letters and despatches demonstrate an increasing remoteness from factual reality" (S. Sears, Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, p.205). In early May, McClellan demanded that McDowell's corps of 40,000, stationed at Fredericksburg to protect Washington, be sent to reinforce him. Though it was easiest and quickest for McDowell to march overland towards Richmond, McClellan insisted this corps be sent by water. Lincoln immediately perceived that an overland approach would have the advantage of protecting the capital, since McDowell's force would be between the Confederates and Washington, while McClellan's plan would leave the capital exposed. Lincoln gave explicit orders that McDowell was to retain command of his force and McClellan was not to give McDowell any order which would put him out of position to defend Washington. "By...Lincoln's plan, McDowell was not going to McClellan as a reinforcement, but as a separate, cooperating army" (T.H.Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, p.95). On May 21, a distraught and angry McClellan wrote the President a rambling 10-page despatch, "almost incoherent in spots" (see Sears, pp.270-271, and notes in Basler 5:226). He reiterated his perception that his army was drastically outnumbered, again urged McDowell's corp be sent by water, and insisted that "my own department should embrace the entire field of active military operations" against Richmond. The present is Lincoln's patient, thoughtful response. In his insight that Confederate opposition to McDowell's march would necessarily draw strength from the army opposing McClellan, the letter vividly exhibits Lincoln's growing command of tactical and strategic issues. As Williams has written, "with no knowledge of the theory of war, no experience in war, and no technical training, Lincoln, by the power of his mind, became a fine strategist...His strategic thinking was sound and for a rank amateur astonishingly good" (pp.7-8). But a few days later, when mobile Confederate forces under T.J. Jackson launched an offensive up the Shenandoah Valley, Lincoln had little choice but to cancel McDowell's movement to the peninsula (which he did on May 24) so that his corps could pursue "Stonewall" Jackson. Published in Collected Works, ed. R.P. Basler, 5: 226-227.
LINCOLN TO MCCLELLAN ON TACTICS FOR THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN
An important letter at a crucial point in the Union army's ultimately unsuccessful land offensive against the Confederate capital. It is one of the most significant letters in what constitutes a particularly important exchange between the Commander-in-Chief and General McClellan, a correspondence extensively studied and analyzed by Lincoln's biographers and historians of the war.
Lincoln writes: "Your long despatch of yesterday just received. You will have just such control of Gen. McDowell and his force as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg,--unless his march shall be resisted [by the Confederate army], in which case, the force resisting him, will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single Division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it."
"I would hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success," Lincoln once quipped. McClellan's plan to take Richmond by landing the main Union army on the peninsula, 75 miles below Richmond, had been reluctantly approved by the President, who feared it would leave the city of Washington unprotected. Having assured Lincoln that troops adequate to defend the capital had been left behind, McClellan's armies were transported by ship to Fortress Monroe in March and in April, after repeated urgings from Lincoln, began to move, ponderously and cautiously, up the peninsula, taking Yorktown after a wasteful seige, on May 3. McClellan, a Democrat, became increasingly convinced that the Confederate armies heavily outnumbered his men, and developed a paranoic conviction that the Republican administration was witholding support and even--perhaps for political reasons--wished him to fail. In this period, "his letters and despatches demonstrate an increasing remoteness from factual reality" (S. Sears, Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, p.205). In early May, McClellan demanded that McDowell's corps of 40,000, stationed at Fredericksburg to protect Washington, be sent to reinforce him. Though it was easiest and quickest for McDowell to march overland towards Richmond, McClellan insisted this corps be sent by water. Lincoln immediately perceived that an overland approach would have the advantage of protecting the capital, since McDowell's force would be between the Confederates and Washington, while McClellan's plan would leave the capital exposed. Lincoln gave explicit orders that McDowell was to retain command of his force and McClellan was not to give McDowell any order which would put him out of position to defend Washington. "By...Lincoln's plan, McDowell was not going to McClellan as a reinforcement, but as a separate, cooperating army" (T.H.Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, p.95). On May 21, a distraught and angry McClellan wrote the President a rambling 10-page despatch, "almost incoherent in spots" (see Sears, pp.270-271, and notes in Basler 5:226). He reiterated his perception that his army was drastically outnumbered, again urged McDowell's corp be sent by water, and insisted that "my own department should embrace the entire field of active military operations" against Richmond. The present is Lincoln's patient, thoughtful response. In his insight that Confederate opposition to McDowell's march would necessarily draw strength from the army opposing McClellan, the letter vividly exhibits Lincoln's growing command of tactical and strategic issues. As Williams has written, "with no knowledge of the theory of war, no experience in war, and no technical training, Lincoln, by the power of his mind, became a fine strategist...His strategic thinking was sound and for a rank amateur astonishingly good" (pp.7-8). But a few days later, when mobile Confederate forces under T.J. Jackson launched an offensive up the Shenandoah Valley, Lincoln had little choice but to cancel McDowell's movement to the peninsula (which he did on May 24) so that his corps could pursue "Stonewall" Jackson. Published in Collected Works, ed. R.P. Basler, 5: 226-227.
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Tax exempt.